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Abstract
Standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models are
populated by fully-informed-optimising Muth-rational agents. This kind
of agent is at odds with well-known psychological biases, not to mention
real life people. In particular, there are strong theoretical and empirical
reasons to believe that consumers are overly optimistic. Also, the size
of over optimism is likely to show cyclical features. In this paper we
simulate two DSGE models, one standard with Muth-rational consumers,
the other di¤erent just because agents are allowed to over consume. We
then compare them throughout di¤erent cyclical phases. Results show
that taking into account psychological biases allows the DSGE to t better
actual data in the long-run and in an economic boom scenario. Recessions
are instead characterized by pessimism.
We also nd that over consumption is a structural trait. Moreover,
booms enlarge signicantly the magnitude of the bias. These ndings are
in line with - and enrich - both the economic and psychological literature,
implying i) that the business cycle has a non trivial psychological content,
and ii) that the size of psychological biases is a¤ected by macroeconomic
evolutions.
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1 Introduction
Standard DSGE are small-scale models formally analyzing an economic system.
DSGE proponents assume that the system is populated by a representative
utility-maximizing Muthian agent which operates subject to budget constraints
and technological restrictions. Over time these models have become widespread
and commonly used because they are a powerful tool that provide a coher-
ent framework for policy discussion and economic analysis. In principle, they
can help to identify sources of uctuations, answer questions about structural
changes, forecast the e¤ect of policy changes, etc. Despite its widespread use,
it has long been known that the conditions behind standard DSGE models are
rather stringent. The rational expectations hypothesis is among them. On the
theoretical side, Muth-rationality has been questioned by very many authors.
Just to mention, the adaptive learning literature (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001)
argues that individuals must relentlessly learnto try to be Muth-rational.
In their theory of heuristics and biases Kahneman and Tversky (1973, 1974,
and 1982) - and their numerous followers - have convincingly suggested that
intuitive strategies and simple heuristics are reasonably e¤ective some of the
time, but they also produce biases and give rise to systematic incongruities that
are at odds with rational expectations.
In our setting it is worth noticing that psychologists rarely give indications
about the size of these biases. On the empirical side, DSGE models still need
to prove their ability to t the data, especially in extraordinary cyclical phases.
Since the last nancial crisis and the subsequent great recession, indeed, a num-
ber of dissenting views have appeared in the literature (Manski, 2010; Caballero,
2010; Pesaran and Smith, 2011). As per psychological distortions Bovi (2009) re-
ports evidence on the enduring presence of these biases throughout two decades
and several European countries.
In particular, data conrm that people tend to form systematically over op-
timistic - with respect to Muth rationality - predictions. As per the typically
maintained rational expectations hypothesis behind the DSGE models, two im-
portant points must be noted.
First, the mentoined biases are not transitory. Second they likely a¤ect the
majority of individuals and, therefore, even the representative agent operating
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in DSGE models.
It is unsurprisingly, then, that recently some economists have been inserting
psychological issues - in particular overcondence and overly optimism - within
the framework of DSGE models. Some instances are the following. Farmer
(2010) has estimated and compared two DSGE Keynesian models. The old-
Keynesiandi¤ers from the new-Keynesianmodel because its Phillips curve
is replaced with a belief function to determine expectations of nominal income
growth. Data show that the old-Keynesian model ts the data better than its
new-Keynesian competitor. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006) have found that over-
condence can increase business cycle volatility. In addition, they have argued
that optimistic agents expect an unrealistically high average rate of investment-
specic technical change, and so they consistently overinvest. Milani (2011) has
estimated a DSGE model relaxing the rational expectations assumption to eval-
uate the empirical role of expectational shocks on business cycle uctuations.
The foregoing motivates our paper. Allowing over consumption in an oth-
erwise standard DSGE setting we are able to shed some light on the above
mentioned psychological and economic literature. On the one side, we can af-
ford to quantify the size of psycho-induced over consumption both in the long
runand during di¤erent cyclical phases. On the other side, we can test whether
the tness of a psycho-biases augmented (PBA) DSGE model dominates that
of a standard rational expectations (RE) DSGE one.
The analysis of di¤erent business cycle phases is particularly important here.
In fact, one can expect that the e¤ect of psychological factors could be magnied
when the economy is improving.
Short-run self-fullling expectations and hedge behavior may play a role
especially in booms (e.g., Farmer, 2010). By the same token, one can expect that
amid recessions over consumption could be lowered both because of objective
and of psychological reasons. As per the former, i) in crisis the cost of erring is
higher and ii) the cost of information is lower. Think about the strong media
coverage during economic crises (Curtin, 2003; Doms and Morin, 2004). As per
the latter, the theory of depressive realism argues that depressed people tend to
be more realistic than normal individuals. Alloy and Abramson (1979) and
followers (for a review, see Abramson et al., 2002) have pointed out that non-
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depressed people are more likely than depressed people to think that outcomes
are contingent on their actions when they are not. They concluded that as
opposed to demoralized persons, whose perceptions are apparently accurate,
normal people distort reality in an optimistic fashion.The point is that the
number of discouraged people is negatively correlated with the GDP growth
rate.
It is important to note that our setting also allows examining how macroeco-
nomic evolutions a¤ect over consumption. This reverse engineering the view-
point maintained by the macroeconomic literature, whereas psychological fac-
tors are inserted in macromodels to understand the business cycle.
Results show that nesting psycho-biases into a mainstream DSGE model
improves the tness of this latter in all the cyclical phases.
It turns out that, as argued by psychology, over consumption is a structural
trait.
We also nd that the magnitude of the distortion is signicantly positive
and larger during booms with respect to crises (to the extent that booms can
be seen as "gains", our evidence is also somewhat in line with the theory of
prospect).
Again, these ndings support our hypotheses about the peculiar links be-
tween psycho-biases and consumption.
All in all, thus, our evidence supports the psycho-induced nature of the over
consumption featuring the data.
The paper is organised as follows.
In the next section we describe the theoretical model from which our analysis
begins, in section 3 we discuss the overconndence hypothesis and how it may be
inserted in a standard DSGE model. In section 4, we describe the empirical data
used in our study and the methodology employed to estimate the parameters.
In section 5, we analyse the models dynamics through the impulse response
functions and we compare the performance of the di¤erent models specication
through the measures of entropy. In section 6, we conclude.
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2 The Theoretical Model
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models are built on microeconomic foun-
dations and emphasize the rational agentsintertemporal choices. DSGE models
are usually organised in three separate but interrelated blocks each modelling
the behavior of three representative agents, namely the household, the rm and
the policymaker.
The general equilibrium nature of the model captures the interaction between
policy actions and agentsbehavior. The dependence of current choices on fu-
ture uncertain outcomes makes the model dynamic and assigns a central role to
agentsexpectations in the determination of current macroeconomic outcomes.
Therefore, e.g., output and ination tomorrow, and thus their expectations as
of today, depend on monetary policy tomorrow in the same way as they do
today; of course, taking into account what will happen from then on into the
innite future. The explanation so far refers to the equilibrium aspect of the
model. The stochastic nature of the DSGE model allows out-of-equilibrium
realizations. Every period random exogenous events perturb the equilibrium
conditions, injecting uncertainty in the evolution of the economy and thus gen-
erating economic uctuations. Without these shocks, the economy would evolve
along a perfectly predictable path, with neither booms nor recessions. Markup
shocks, for example, a¤ect the pricing decisions of the rm that underlies the
supply block, while demand shocks capture changes in the willingness of house-
holds to purchase the goods produced by the rm.
More specically, ours is a standard three-blocks new-Keynesian closed econ-
omy DSGE model with rational expectations. The demand block captures the
representative households behavior, the supply block models the representative
rms decisions. In the policy block the key policy variable is the interest rate to
reect the tendency of central banks to raise the short-term interest rate when
the economy is overheating as well as when ination rises, and to lower it in the
presence of economic slack. By adjusting the nominal interest rate, monetary
policy in turn a¤ects real activity and through it ination, and eventually the
e¤ect acts on the supply block. The policy rule therefore closes the circle, giving
us a complete model of the relationship between three key endogenous variables:
real output, ination, and the nominal interest rate.
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Clearly, there are several potential candidates for our goals. However, the se-
lected framework is representative of a larger class of models and it is commonly
used in both macroeconomic practice and literature. Thus, the version we pro-
pose is the result of several validations and renements. Our benchmark model
is rich enough to provide a satisfactory empirical account of the evolution of
output, ination, and interest rate. All in all, the chosen model is a suitable
and robust benchmark for our aims.
We are now ready to present more formally our benchmark model (for details,
see Galí, 2003 and 2008, Smets and Wouters, 2003 and Galì and Monacelli,
2008). All the variables are expressed in log-deviations from their steady state
values: 8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
yt = (1  ) ct + gteyt = yt   ynt
ynt = at
t = 
e
t+1 +
(1 )(1 )
 mct
mct = wt   at
ct =


1+

ct 1 + ( 11+ )c
e
t+1  

1 
1+

 (rt   et+1)
wt =

1
1 

ct + nt  


1 

ct 1
nt = yt   at
rt = t + yeyt
at = at 1 + at
gt = 'gt 1 + 
g
t
(1)
The subscript t means at time t, y is current output, ey is the output gap, yn is
the fully-exible price output, r is the nominal interest rate,  is the ination
rate, g is the public expenditure, mc denotes the real marginal cost of rms,
w are real wages, a is the labor productivity, n is labor and xet+1 denotes the
rational expectation of variable x at time t + 1 formed at time t: The last
two equations determine the stochastic dynamics of the labor productivity and
public expenditure. The stochastic perturbations a and g are I.I.D.
Table 1 collects and describes the economic meaning of the parameters of our
model.
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Table 1: Denition of the model parameters
 steady state government spending share
 persistence in private consumption
 persistence of public expenditure
' persistence of labor productivity
 rate of time preference
 index of price rigidity
 intertemporal elasticity of substitution for leisure (Frisch elasticity)
 sensitivity of central bankers to ination
y sensitivity of central bankers to cyclical stances
3 Nesting Psychology in the DSGE Model
In this section we emphasise the reasons why it may be useful to take into
account the possibility that agents may follow biased - with respect to Muth-
optimal ones - consumption paths. Specically, we will argue that this structural
bias should be strictly positive and that it should increase with GDP growth.
It is also important to note that the following argumentation allows drawning
the set of the hypotheses to be tested in this paper.
It is well-known that most people are overcondent about their own relative
abilities, and unreasonably optimistic about their future (see, e.g., Camerer and
Lovallo, 1999). As Kahneman put it: "The bottom line is that all the biases
in judgment that have been identied [by psychologists] in the last fteen years
tend to bias decision-making toward the hawkish side."1
Similarly, Shiller (2000, page 142) has argued that "Yet some basic tendency
towards overcondence appears to be a robust human character trait: the bias
is denitely toward overcondence rather than undercondence." Bovi (2009)
reports evidence on the enduring presence of psychological biases throughout
two decades and several European countries.
In particular, data conrm that European citizens tend to be systematically
overly bullish. There are also papers testing the presence and examining the
1This quotation is reported in Johnson et al. (2006).
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e¤ects of overcondence - Koellinger et al. (2007), Abreu and Mendes (2012),
Fellner and Krugel (2012). Although we are aware of the di¤erence between
them2 , in the present setting we consider over-optimism and overcondence as
equivalent terms in the sense that both generate the bias that we want to add to
our PBA DSGE model. In fact, several authors show that these two biases tend
to go hand-in-hand. Kahneman and Tversky (1979a, 1979b) demonstrate that
human judgment is generally optimistic due to overcondence. Montier (2007)
concludes the over-optimism and overcondence tend to have the same causes -
the illusion of control and the illusion of knowledge. Brunnermeier and Parker
(2005) have then argued that, in a consumption-saving example, consumers are
both overcondent and over-optimistic. Baker and Nofsinger (2010) o¤er a re-
cent survey reinforcing the point. Coming back to our main point, the foregoing
suggests that there are strong theorical and empirical reasons to think that the
majority of people is overly optimistic and may be induced to over consume.
Thus, in the empirical part of the paper we hypothesise that the representative
agent populating DSGE models should be allowed to consume di¤erently from
Muth-rationality. It may be useful here to recall Brunnermeier and Parkers ar-
gument on over optimism (2005). Their conclusions on over optimism are based
on the assumption that people maximize average felicity, optimally balancing
this benet of optimism against the costs of worse decision making. Otherwise
stated, they examine distorted expectations while maintaining that agents op-
timize knowing the correct mapping from actions to payo¤s in di¤erent states
of the world.
We draw more deeply from psychology - our agents are over optimists not
because it is rationale to do that. Their decisions are biased because of a number
of unavoidable psychological reasons (one would say deep reasons, following
the mainstream economics jargon). We assume that because psychologists con-
vincingly suggest that people use rules of thumb with no sign that they learn
or are totally aware of the cost of their decisions (Bovi, 2009). This notwith-
standing, we share with Brunnermeier and Parkers setting the crucial fact that,
when psychological stimuli are taken into account, over consumption emerges
2The expectations of optimistic agents are biased toward good outcomes, while overcon-
dent agents overestimate the precision of the signals that they receive.
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as a structural feature of agentsdecision making. Though, as said, over con-
sumption is likely to be a structural trait of the human behavior, it can also
be conceptualised that the bias reacts to cyclical phases in a predictable way.
It let us to test another two assumptions, o¤ering even more discipline to our
exercise. During goldilocks periods, indeed, there can emerge a tendency to be
even more optimistic than usual. Given the structural over optimism, in fact,
self fullling expectations may emerge especially during booms (Farmer, 2010),
in that creating the tendency for being even more bullish. In addition, this
could trigger herd behaviors whereas even less optimistic agents over consume
(Milani, 2011; De Grauwe, 2012). Using the famous Mr. Greenspans words,
"irrational exuberance" is at work (see also Shiller, 2000). The rationale for over
consumption to be lower amid crises can be described as follows. Both economic
and psychological elements play a role (Bovi, 2009). As per the former, in bad
times the cost to err is higher while the cost of information is lower. Think
about the strong media coverage during economic crises (Curtin, 2003; Doms
and Morin, 2004). Thus, there are both more motivations and more occasions
to act as a muthian. In fact, given bounded rationality and the like, to try to
act as muthians. As per the latter, the theory of the depressive realism (for a
review, see Abramson et al., 2002) convincingly argues that discouraged people
are less decoupled from reality than "normal" individuals.
The point is that the share of sadden individuals obviously increases in eco-
nomic turmoil. Note that the theory of the depressive realism is coherent with
the theories supporting the structural - i.e. normal- over optimism: typically
the majority of people is not demoralized. As mentioned, we are interested in
testing whether psycho-biases a¤ect and are a¤ected by macroeconomic evolu-
tions. Our denition of psycho-bias is accordingly very general such that to
include all the systematic psycho-driven consumption that may explain that
part of the business cycle which is typically left unexplained by mainstream
rational expectations DSGE models.
In order to introduce the agentsover consumption into the rational expec-
tations model in (1), this latter needs to be rearranged.
One simple and e¤ective way to do so is to add to the standard consumption
function an element allowing households to follow both Muth-rational and biased
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behaviors.
More specically and formally, the psycho-biased augmented (PBA) new-
Keynesian model we refer to is equal to (1), but for the fact that in the Euler
equation modeling
the private consumption, ct, we insert the expected component, cet :
 Rational expectations (RE) - benchmark: Model (1) with
ct =


1 + 

ct 1 + (
1
1 + 
)cet+1  

1  
1 + 

 (rt   et+1)
 Psychological biases (PBA): Model (1) with  > 0
ct =


1 + 

ct 1 + (
1
1 + 
)cet+1 + 
cet+1  1  1 + 

 (rt   et+1)
It should be clear that the rationale for this new element derives from the
previous discussion about the representative individual tendency toward over
consumption. Specically, note that we plug the bias using the module of the
expected consumption times delta. The logic for that is that our key parameter
is delta, which we assume to be greater than zero - the module ensures us that
a positive sign of delta implies over consumption. However, in simulations we
allow delta to assume even negative or zero values. By letting the data speak
we can thus obtain more robust evidence.
It may also be added that just as the theorised presence of habits justies
the presence of the lagged consumption in the Euler equation, the theorised
presence of psycho-biases justies the presence of the expected consumption in
the Euler equation. Last but not least, note that the PBA model generalises
the RE one - by construction when  = 0 they are equal.
Given our goal, we examine the two models under di¤erent circumstances:
 whole sample (the "long run");
 subsample of economic booms;
 subsample of economic recessions3 ;
3 In this framework an economic boom is dened a context in the presence of a positive
cyclical output growth, i.e.  lnYt > 0, whereas an economic recession occurs whenever
 lnYt < 0:
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The rst exercise allows gathering information on the size of the structural
over consumption, the other two exercises aim at shedding some light on the
cyclical behavior of over consumption. Altogether they provide a suitable frame-
work to test our hypotheses and the necessary information to address our re-
search goals.
4 Data and Estimation methodology
The inferential methodology adopted to estiamte the model parameters, to sim-
ulate and analyze the dynamic behavior of the relevant variables is based on
Monte Carlo Markow Chains (MCMC) algorithm, that belongs to the family
of Bayesian estimation. We build a multi-chain MCMC procedure based on 4
chains of size 100,00; the algorith converges within 55,000 iterations to its cor-
rected expected value, and, according to these results, we discard the rst 55,000
draws from each chain to remove any dependence from the initial conditions.
In detail, our estimation procedure is based on two steps. In the rst step,
we estimate the mode of the posterior distribution by maximizing the log pos-
terior density function, which is a combination of the prior information on the
structural parameters with the likelihood of the data. In the second step, we
use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm in order to draw a complete picture of
the posterior distribution and compute the log marginal likelihood of the model.
The convergence diagnostic is based on Brooks and Gelman (1998) method.
All of the model computations have been performed using DYNARE soft-
ware4 . Below, we summarize the measurement equations considered, i.e. the
relationships between the model variables (on the right side) and the data (on
the left side): 24  lnPt
 lnYt
35 =
24 

35+ 100 
24 t
yt   yt 1
35 (2)
where  lnXt stands for 100(lnXt   lnXt 1), Pt is the personal consump-
tion expendituresprice index, Yt is the real GDP,  = 100  (   1) is the real
GDP quarterly trend growth rate and  = 100(   1) is the quarterly steady-
4Dynare is a software that is freely available from the website http://www.dynare.org and
has the ability to simulate and estimate economic models
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state ination rate. The dataset consists of quarterly data for real GDP and per-
sonal consumption expendituresprice referring to the US from 1959q2:2014q1.
The source of the data is Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).
Following the logic of this paper, we have used standard values and distribu-
tions (see Table 2) for the prior densities of the parameters of the system (1) as
suggested by the literature. In particular, we have adopted the mean values, the
standard deviations and distributions reported in Smets and Wouters (2007) for
the parameters related to the utility function and monetary policy, whereas we
have followed real business cycle literature (King and Rebelo, 1999) and Smets
and Wouters (2003) for the high persistence in labor productivity and public
expenditure. The prior mean value for the steady state government spending
share is the average ratio between US real public expenditure and real GDP
from 1959q2:2014q1.
In the following table, we compare prior and posterior ditributions of the
parameters in the absence of psycho-bias, i.e.  = 0 :
Table 2: Prior and Posterior Distribution of Structural Parameters:
the benchmark case
Parameter Prior distribution Post. distribution
Distr. Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean Conf. Interval 95%




y

'




a
g
beta 0.75 0.05
beta 0.90 0.10
gamma 2.00 0.75
normal 1.50 0.25
normal 0.125 0.05
beta 0.975 0.10
beta 0.90 0.05
beta 0.26 0.05
gamma 0.83 0.10
normal 0.76 0.10
beta 0.75 0.10
inv.gamma 0.10 2.00
inv.gamma 0.10 2.00
0.77 0.77 [0.7636 0.7689]
0.88 0.88 [0.8763 0.8806]
2.04 2.03 [1.9987 2.0559]
1.47 1.47 [1.4586 1.4866]
0.00 0.005 [0.0028 0.0077]
1.00 0.999 [0.9971 1.0000]
0.97 0.973 [0.9723 0.9738]
0.22 0.22 [0.2121 0.2273]
0.68 0.83 [0.6716 0.6836]
0.77 0.78 [0.7749 0.7792]
0.83 0.83 [0.8222 0.8327]
0.02 0.02 [0.0176 0.0189]
0.04 0.04 [0.0359 0.0381]
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The posterior values are substantially in line with the prior ones except
for the steady state share of public expenditure on GDP, the sensitivity of
Central Bank to ination, the standard errors of labor productivity and public
expenditure processes, that exhibit a strong negative shift, and the index of
price rigidity that has a positive shift.
The log-marginal value of the likelihood in this standard case, computed by
Laplace approximation is -460.38.
In table 3, we show prior and posterior distributions of the parameters in
the presence of psycho-bias; in this case, the Euler equation of (1) reads as
ct =


1 + 

ct 1 + (
1
1 + 
)cet+1 + 
cet+1  1  1 + 

 (rt   et+1)
The prior distribution of psycho-bias, , is assumed gamma with a mean
close to zero and unitary standard error. This choice is driven by the over
consumption hypothesis, implying positive values of ; the almost zero-mean5
hypothesis allows us to collapse the psycho-bias case to the benchmark one in
expected value. Finally, the high value of the standard error does not bind the
posterior value of  in a narrow range:
The log-marginal value of the likelihood for this case is -417.74. In order to
compare this scenario () with the benchmark case (b) we build the Bayes factor
through the Laplace method to approximate the integrated likelihood (Kass and
Raftery, 1995 and Lewis and Raftery, 1997), that is:
B;b = 2 ln

f (YjMPBA)
f (YjMRE)

(3)
where
f (YjMm) =
Z
f (Yjm;Mm) f (mjMm) dm m = PBA;RE (4)
with MPBA and MRE indicating respectively the PBA model and RE model.
The Bayes factor is equal to 85.28, that supports decisively the specication
including the psycho-bias parameter. Hence, the PBA model is able to better
capture the stylized facts concerning the business cycle.
The posterior value of the mode psycho-bias parameter  is signicantly
5Gamma distribution is not dened for a mean equal to 0, hence we choose a value close
to zero but greater than it (0.01).
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Table 3: Prior and Posterior Distribution of Structural Parameters:
the psycho-bias case
Parameter Prior distribution Post. distribution
Distr. Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean Conf. Interval 95%





y

'




a
g
beta 0.75 0.05
beta 0.90 0.10
gamma 2.00 0.75
gamma 0.01 1.00
normal 1.50 0.25
normal 0.125 0.05
beta 0.975 0.10
beta 0.90 0.05
beta 0.26 0.05
gamma 0.83 0.10
normal 0.76 0.10
beta 0.75 0.10
inv.gamma 0.10 2.50
inv.gamma 0.10 2.40
0.85 0.86 [0.8310 0.8735]
1.00 0.97 [0.9458 1.0000]
2.04 2.03 [1.8591 2.1629]
0.33 0.32 [0.0100 0.5855]
1.39 1.38 [1.2856 1.4718]
0.00 0.0029 [0.0000 0.0063]
1.00 0.999 [0.9957 1.0000]
0.96 0.96 [0.9498 0.9679]
0.28 0.28 [0.2443 0.3067]
0.80 0.81 [0.7383 0.8724]
0.76 0.71 [0.6382 0.7778]
0.89 0.89 [0.8816 0.8972]
0.03 0.03 [0.0218 0.0316]
0.03 0.03 [0.0255 0.0325]
di¤erent from zero6 , thus conrming the empirical validity of the psycho-bias
hypothesis in the Euler equation.
Furthermore, there is a positive shift of the intertemporal discount factor,
; that strengthens the over-condence hypothesis regarding future consump-
tion. The sensitivity of central bankers to cyclical stances is strongly reduced
(from 0.125 to 0.001) and the sensitivity to ination is slightly decreased. As in
Smets and Wouters (2007), monetary policy appear to react less strongly to the
output gap than to ination as in the rational expectation case. Moreover, the
consumption persistence parameter, , is higher than the previous case, thus
indicating greater adjustment costs in consumption between t   1 and t: The
remaining posterior values of the parameters are quite similar to the benchmark
6 In order to save space, we have not published the values of the posterior standard devia-
tions, from which the statistical signicance of the mode of parameters is derived. This piece
of information is available upon request.
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case.
In table 4, there is a comparison between prior and posterior distributions
of the parameters for the subsample of economic boom. In this case the psycho-
bias parameter  is still signicantly di¤erent from zero, but also greater than
the "long run" case. The Frish elasticity of labor supply

1


exhibits a positive
shift, that indicates more exibility in the labor market in this business cycle
phase, whereas price-rigidity, , is higher than the rational expectations and
"long run" psycho-bias cases.
Table 4: Prior and Posterior Distribution of Structural Parameters:
the psycho-bias case with boom
Parameter Prior distribution Post. distribution
Distr. Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean Conf. Interval 95%





y

'




a
g
beta 0.75 0.05
beta 0.90 0.10
gamma 2.00 0.75
gamma 0.01 1.00
normal 1.50 0.25
normal 0.125 0.05
beta 0.975 0.10
beta 0.90 0.05
beta 0.26 0.05
gamma 0.83 0.10
normal 0.79 0.10
beta 0.98 0.10
inv.gamma 0.10 3.60
inv.gamma 0.10 2.30
0.72 0.75 [0.6927 0.8133]
1.00 0.91 [0.7677 1.0000]
1.96 1.73 [1.0996 2.5422]
3.77 2.64 [0.0100 5.0156]
1.48 1.30 [1.0865 1.5993]
0.02 0.01 [0.0000 0.0131]
0.79 0.85 [0.7689 0.9217]
0.96 0.97 [0.9495 0.9809]
0.34 0.21 [0.1225 0.3012]
0.77 0.71 [0.6311 0.7862]
0.61 0.70 [0.5359 0.8289]
0.83 0.84 [0.7943 0.8975]
0.02 0.04 [0.0219 0.0617]
0.02 0.03 [0.0182 0.0427]
Also in this case the Bayes factor (equal to 60.92) corroborates the PBA
model with respect to the RE one.
Finally, table 5 deals with the subsample of economic recession. The poste-
rior value of the mode of  in this case is not di¤erent from zero, thus rejecting
the PBA model in this scenario. Indeed, this result is coherent with the empiri-
cal evidence found by Bovi (2009): in bad times over critical judgements about
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the economic conditions occur, due also to the inuence of the media, and hence
there is not any space for over condence.
The worse performance of the PBA model compared to the RE one in a
recessive phase of the business cycle is also conrmed by the Bayes factor (equal
to -222.35) that strongly supports the Muth-rationality.
The intertemporal discount factor, , in this case has a negative shift with
respect to the prior mean, thus showing a smaller degree of preference for future
consumption in the negative phases of the business cycle. The Frish elasticity
of labor supply

1


decreases compared to the prior mean as is the case for
the price rigidity index, : Furthermore, in this case the Taylor rule parameters
exhibit a positive shift, thus showing that during recessions monetary policy
overreacts both to ination and output gap with respect to the standard case.
Table 5: Prior and Posterior Distribution of Structural Parameters:
the psycho-bias case with recession
Parameter Prior distribution Post. distribution
Distr. Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean Conf. Interval 95%





y

'




a
g
beta 0.75 0.05
beta 0.90 0.10
gamma 2.00 0.75
gamma 0.01 1.00
normal 1.50 0.25
normal 0.125 0.05
beta 0.975 0.10
beta 0.90 0.05
beta 0.26 0.05
gamma 1.13 0.10
normal -0.76 0.10
beta 0.75 0.10
inv.gamma 0.10 2.80
inv.gamma 0.10 0.95
0.76 0.77 [0.7650 0.7793]
0.89 0.89 [0.8775 0.9030]
2.11 2.12 [2.0063 2.3038]
0.00 0.0058 [0.0000 0.0178]
1.54 1.52 [1.4856 1.5817]
0.14 0.13 [0.1230 0.1500]
0.96 0.94 [0.9355 0.9510]
0.90 0.90 [0.8964 0.9090]
0.26 0.25 [0.2439 0.2677]
1.15 1.16 [1.1523 1.1702]
-0.73 -0.71 [-0.7338 -0.6943]
0.73 0.72 [0.7012 0.7352]
0.03 0.02 [0.0176 0.0281]
0.05 0.04 [0.0331 0.0524]
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5 Results
5.1 The Models Dynamics
In this section, we discuss the dynamic response of the relevant variables when
the economy is hit by stochastic shocks on labor productivity and public expen-
diture, namely impulse response functions (IRFs).
Note that for all of the IRFs, the size of the standard deviations of the
stochastic shocks and the variables responses relate to the posterior-average
of the IRFs for each draw of the MCMC algorithm, together with 95 percent
condence intervals7 . Moreover, because the variables are expressed in logs, the
measures of the responses can be read as elasticities.
In gures 1 and 2, we show the dynamic responses of the models variables in
the presence of a labor productivity and public expenditure shocks when  = 0
(absence of any psychological bias). Indeed this is a standard DSGE model
with habit formation in consumption (Galí, 2003 and 2008, Smets and Wouters,
2003).
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Figure 1: Impulse response functions for a positive labor productivity shock with  = 0
An increase in labor productivity generates a positive growth of actual out-
7The condence intervals have been computed as the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of the em-
pirical distributions obtained by the algorithm.
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put and potential output; nevertheless, the latter increases by more than the
former because of price stickiness (Calvo, 1983). In fact, this distorsion implies
that only a fraction of producers lowers the prices when a positive supply shock
hits the economy: hence, actual output does not grow in the same proportion of
the shock because private consumption increases by less than the fully exible
price equilibrium. As a consequence of this, output gap decreases. The short
term nominal interest rate reduces as a response of output gap and ination
diminishing. The increase in labor productivity generates a contraction in the
real marginal costs, that are also decreased by a reduction in the real wages
due to the fall in labor demand. In fact, as the empirical literature has widely
shown (Christiano et al. 1992 and Galì 1999, among the others), actual output
does not increase in the same proportion of the technology shock for the price
rigidity and hence an employment reduction occurs.
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions for a positive public expenditure shock with  = 0
When a positive shock in public expenditure hits the economy, private con-
sumption decreases due to a crowding out e¤ect; the positive growth of actual
output, pushed up by public sector demand, generates an increase in employ-
ment, in the real wages and so in the real marginal costs. These latter cause a
rise in the ination rate, but the presence of price stickiness reduces the impact
of real marginal costs on ination, thus generating a smaller increase in the
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ination rate than the fully exible price scenario. Therefore, the increase in
the nominal interest rate resulting from the enhanced ination is lower than in
the absence of price stickiness. In this way the consequent crowding out e¤ect
is smaller than the case of fully exible prices and then output gap increases.
When  > 0 (gure 3 and 4), IRFs are qualitatively similar to the case of
rational expectations: the quantitative di¤erences are linked to the di¤erent
values resulting from the estimation process of the parameters:
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions for a positive labor productivity shock with  > 0
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions for a positive public expenditure shock with  > 0
5.2 The ModelsPerformance
The comparison between the models is performed through measures of entropy.
The idea is to measure how the models involved in the racet actual data,
analysing the distance between actual data of private consumption, and those
stemming from simulating the two competitors. These measures are particularly
appropriate for our purposes because they involve the entire empirical distribu-
tion of the data under scrutiny. Thus our measure encompasses all information
provided by statistics like mean, variance, skewness, kurtosis, autocorrelations
at di¤erent lags, and so on. This is di¤erent with respect to what typically done
in the macroeconomic literature where the tness of DSGE models is based on
less general tools such as impulse response functions, standard deviations and
correlations.
The simulated time series for the RE and PBA models are generated through
the MCMC method over the 223 quarters represented in the sample for from
1959q2:2014q1. For each quarter, we draw 100,000 realizations of the stochastic
shocks described and identied in Section 4. Next, we take the expected value
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of this sequence as the corresponding value for each quarter8 . The peculiar
measure of entropy we use can be briey described as follows. If we consider
a generic sample of real numbers fx1; x2; : : : ; xNg, with N 2 N, the entropy is
given by:
E =
NX
k=1
jxkjPN
j=1 jxj j
 log
 
jxkjPN
j=1 jxj j
!
(5)
Armed with this denition, we compute the reference entropies, i.e. those related
to actual data. We denote Ec the reference entropy for consumption. Then, we
calculate the entropies of the simulated series, for both the RE and the PBA
model, as coming out from the estimation of the parameter . We denote them
as EREc (rational expectations) and EPBAc (psychological biases).
Clearly, in our context the sign of the distances does not matter. Therefore, the
absolute value of the di¤erence between the entropies referring to actual data
and those referring to the RE model represents our three benchmark distances:
dREc = jEREc   Ecj (6)
Similarly, we measure the distances between the entropy related to consumption
in the cases of the PBA model and those related to actual data:
dc = jEPBAc   Ecj (7)
As it should be clear, the PBA model dominates the RE one if and only if
D;REc = d

c   dREc < 0
The evaluation of the performance through entropies has been implemented for
the overall sample of data:
Table 6 collects the ndings, whereas in table 7 we report the di¤erences in
(6) and (7).
The empirical moments calculated on the simulated data show that for the
whole sample, PBA model dominates the RE one for consumption and output
data with a percentage relative improvement respectively of 15% and 30%.
In the sub-sample of boom, PBA model has a relative better performance
than the RE one for ination and output with a percentage relative improvement
respectively of 19% and 4.6%.
8Hence, our estimate for each quarter is the average of all the trajectories obtained.
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Real data Consumption Ination Output
ENTIRE SAMPLE -5,22488144 -5,179040033 -5,197282252
SUB-SAMPLE OF BOOM -5,099315553 -5,05401485 -5,069978629
SUB-SAMPLE OF RECESSION -3,116948633 -3,146713182 -3,092239707
RE model Consumption Ination Output
ENTIRE SAMPLE -5,139635847 -5,151989956 -5,09927735
SUB-SAMPLE OF BOOM -4,553586321 -4,437539173 -4,458158037
SUB-SAMPLE OF RECESSION -4,48189807 -4,463350478 -4,555663277
PBA model Consumption Ination Output
ENTIRE SAMPLE -5,152276937 -5,080303923 -5,128233501
SUB-SAMPLE OF BOOM -4,544375956 -4,556105382 -4,486054012
SUB-SAMPLE OF RECESSION -4,433961315 -4,446918201 -0,0000000157775
Table 6: Entropies for private consumption. The analyzed case is the overall
sample.
Finally, in the case of recession the slight betterment for consumption and
ination (3% for both the variables) of PBA model compared with RE one is
accompanied by a strong worsening of the output of more than 300%. This
evidence conrms the results of the Bayesian estimation process, stating that
in a recessive phase of the business cycle individuals are not prone to over
conndence.
6 Concluding Remarks
There are strong theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that real life con-
sumers do not behave as the agent populating standard dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models. In particular, main street individuals are
likely to over consume, in the sense that they follow consumptions path higher
than those of Muth-agents. Alike, the size of over optimism is likely to show
cyclical features. Borrowing from both the economic and psychologic literature
we have pinned down some testable hypotheses - i) over consumption is a struc-
tural trait; ii) psychological biases tend to be magnied in booms. Thus, in this
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RE model Consumption Ination Output
ENTIRE SAMPLE 0,085245592 0,027050076 0,098004902
SUB-SAMPLE OF BOOM 0,545729232 0,616475678 0,611820592
SUB-SAMPLE OF RECESSION -1,364949437 -1,346401845 -1,438714644
PBA model Consumption Ination Output
ENTIRE SAMPLE 0,072604503 0,09873611 0,069048751
SUB-SAMPLE OF BOOM 0,554939597 0,497909468 0,583924617
SUB-SAMPLE OF RECESSION -1,317012682 -1,30020502 3,092239691
Table 7: Di¤erences between entropies in the RE and PBA cases and the bench-
mark case. Computations are obtained by using formulas (6) and (7) and the
values reported in Table 6.
paper we have simulated two DSGE models, one standard with Muth-rational
consumers, the other di¤erent just because agents are allowed to over consume.
We have then compared them throughout di¤erent cyclical phases. Results have
shown that taking into account over condence and over optimism allows the
DSGE to t better actual data in the long run and for the expansionary phases
of the business cycle. In recession, instead, individuals are more pessimist due
also to the inuence of the media.
We have also pointed out that over consumption is a structural trait. More-
over, booms turn out to enlarge signicantly the magnitude of the bias. These
empirical outcomes are in line with - and enrich - both the economic and psy-
chological literature, implying i) that the business cycle has a non trivial psy-
chological content, and ii) that the size of psychological biases is a¤ected by
macroeconomic evolutions.
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